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ABSTRACT 
The intention of this paper is to ask Cassirer, within the framework of 
an ideal dialogue, a fundamental question: does the notion of Weltbild 
exist and, if it does, how has it taken shape in his philosophy? In order to 
do so, the paper briefly defines Cassirer’s theoretical reference back-
ground and then it analyzes the question of the construction of the 
―worlds of sense‖, focusing in particular on their connections with lan-
guage, myth, art, and knowledge. 
Conceptual and Methodological Background. Weltbild and Autotelia of 
Symbolic Forms 
The intention of this paper is to ask Cassirer, within the framework of an ideal 
dialogue, a fundamental question: does the notion of Weltbild exist and, if it 
does, how has it taken shape in his philosophy? In order to do so, our essential 
strategy requires firstly to briefly define his theoretical reference background 
in a conceptual way which is neither philological nor historiographical.  
The ideal background for Cassirer’s argument consists, on the one hand, of 
the phenomenological approach, which justifies the ―natural‖ symbolism of 
consciousness. It was this approach, with its gnoseological-style validity, which 
Cassirer, ever a fervent upholder of phenomenalism, employed in order to out-
line his very first indirect debate, with the views upheld by the young Heideg-
ger, in the two-year period from 1912 to 1914. On the other hand, the refer-
ence background consists of the genealogical analysis of the forms of construc-
tion of the truly human dimension, or rather, the symbolic-cultural dimension; 
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such forms are defined by Cassirer, in his later years, as autonomous and auto-
telic spiritual functions, capable of producing not only specifically designated 
individual symbolic constructs, but also the cultural spheres, or worlds of sense 
which these constructs include: language, myth, art, science. The dynamic 
principle of autotelia characterises the function which creates the particular 
symbol and configures the symbolic reference sphere: this means that this 
function self-determines dynamically, not just once and for all, continually set-
ting out conditions for itself and rejecting hetero-determinations. This dy-
namicity, although free, is also oriented towards individualisation and is mir-
rored, during ―periods of grace‖ in history (and not only the history of cul-
ture), by a typical and ―model‖ precipitate of history. That is to say, it is mir-
rored in a symbolic construct, which is of an extremely relevance due to the fact 
that the universal and the particular come together perfectly within it; it is an 
«oeuvre», yet also an act, a rite, a momentous historical event (Cassirer, 1929, 
p. 25), in which the specific formative function is condensed and realised. It is 
this ―special‖ model, prototypical and altogether inexhaustible, which is de-
fined by Cassirer as the original symbolic phenomenon [Urphänomen]: what 
simply is, is, with no more explanation needed.  
That said, Cassirer points out the fundamental difference between Ur-
phänomen and the «basic phenomena» which form the grammar of symbolic 
consciousness, taking us back to where we started talking about the conceptual 
reference background; it is the network of creative functions of «objectivity» in 
which the reality of culture sui generis leads the way for being the anthropo-
logical «signature» of our species. Man is an animal symbolicum due to his 
mental and conscious make-up. The fact that this topic can define the philoso-
pher’s entire theoretical outlook is demonstrated by the fact that the corner-
stone of the primacy of the natural phenomenology of consciousness reap-
pears, in simple terms, also in the Nachlass; in particular, it appears in the col-
lection of notes and observations contained in the first volume of the unedited 
manuscripts, which should have been the fourth volume of Cassirer’s system-
atic work, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.1  
Secondly, let us now turn our attention to the phenomenological investiga-
tion of consciousness. We are never walled-in behind our intra-subjective con-
 
1 The late J.M. Krois, curator of the critical edition of Cassirer’s posthumous writings and fine inter-
preter of the philosopher’s works, rightly entitled this text Zur Metaphysik der symbolischen Formen; 
see Cassirer, 1995. 
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sciousness; on the contrary, not only do we experience it perceptively as pass-
ers-by from one state to another, but also as agents and operators. The three 
basic phenomena, which we are unable to explain any further since they consti-
tute the key to reality, are 1) the phenomenon of the ―I‖, 2) The phenomenon 
of action and 3) the phenomenon of work (Cassirer, 1995, p. 170). In Cas-
sirer’s words: the Self, the Other, the World. The third phenomenon corre-
sponds to the object, to reality, where the construction of sense takes place in 
the perceptive, acting, working consciousness. It is upon this basic and trans-
versal selective and constructive grid that the individual directions of con-
sciousness are rooted. Let us not, however, think that strict divisions exist be-
tween the three basic phenomena; on the contrary, as Cassirer states paradig-
matically for all forms, starting with language itself, the living flow which con-
nects these phenomena is the spontaneity of their vital and spiritual energies, 
necessarily projected towards their own symbolic embodiments. That is to say: 
the forms of perceptive and sensorial elaboration which, through their own 
making, primarily reveal ―the real‖ to human vision according to a specific ori-
entation of sense, which is also a figural style, are referred to by the philoso-
pher as symbolic forms. Axes (functions) of symbolic consciousness, individual 
and unmistakable products, spheres or worlds of sense, all these meanings 
merge in the conceptual constellation of symbolic forms. The latter are auto-
telic: having a purpose in and not apart from themselves [Selbstzweck].  
These arguments lead us to state that the typical styles of construction for 
each formative function can be equated to the notion of Weltbild, and can be 
declined to the plural [Weltbilder] right from the outset. This wording, when-
ever it appears in Cassirer’s writings, could be translated as: the world of myth, 
the world of science, etc. (Cassirer, 1999, p. 89). It is not a case of advocating 
one particular hypostatisation over another, something that Cassirer would 
find inconceivable, but of suggesting an equivalent, to indicate in the autotelia 
the typical constituent and auto-descriptive structure of each symbolic princi-
ple as much towards itself as towards the sphere of its own self-realisations. 
Such a thesis is highly premature here and comes from the analysis of the fun-
damental systematic function performed in relation to Hermann Cohen’s over-
all idea of the ethical doctrine of freedom as an autotelic form, which self-
determines dynamically and not just once, continually setting out conditions 
and creating challenges for itself. This careful scrutiny occurred in the same 
period (1912–14) as the debate between Cassirer, adherent to the Marburg 
school of neo-Kantianism, and the young Heidegger, at that time restless inter-
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locutor of Rickert. This debate had already touched on the question of reality 
and the question of truth as correspondence, a topic which Heidegger later 
took up, in perpetual conflict with Marburg neo-Kantianism, both in Kant und 
das problem der Metaphysik (Heidegger, 19734, p. 83–84) and in Vom We-
sen der Wahrheit.  
In order to understand and ―unravel‖ the philosophical-political implica-
tions of this topic, our brief sketch of Cassirer’s theoretical background needs 
a third step, i.e. we must take for granted the theoretical heart of the Realität-
problem, whilst making reference to the historiographical and historical-
conceptual reconstructions set out elsewhere (Henry, 1990, pp. 445–458). 
We must do this in order to understand how the constant and well-discussed 
rejection of the definition of gnoseological realism paved the way for Cassirer’s 
own theoretical view of it as the philosophy and science of culture. As such, his 
thinking inspired some decisive acquisitions within the qualitatively-inspired 
social sciences, as well as within aesthetics as an interpretative discipline of the 
symbolic-perceptive phenomena of present time. In fact, if we look at the direc-
tion of the gnoseological debate over the last fifty years, it becomes unneces-
sary to point out the distinction between sensation and perception, insofar as it 
is not in itself worthless; however that may be, and finding ourselves with Cas-
sirer at the heart of the philosophy of neo-criticism, let us remember that per-
ception designates a complex and structured cognitive process which includes 
a wide range of individual feelings and refers them to a given ―quid‖ which dif-
fers in respect of both the percipient and the other givens. The single symbolic 
function colours and shapes the numerous perceptions it addresses according 
to its own characterising form. 
1. A Question of Reality, the Truth of Being, Styles of Construction of the 
Worlds of Sense 
Question: What is Being? What is Reality? 
Answer, from an enchanted illustrated children’s book: If 
this [a sheep ridden by a Martian] lives in a book, then this 
sheep also exists. (Cousseau, 2010, p. 7) 
In other words: could we picture an image which consists of nothing other than 
its external aspect, without validating the objection that the most important 
thing is missing? The answer to the question about validity is yet another ques-
tion, or a need — the need for there to exist a construct endowed with sense, in 
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the form of an image of the world. From the above, we know that, according to 
Cassirer, every symbolic form contributes in a particular way (modality) to the 
formation of both the concept of the ―I‖ and the concept of the ―world‖. The 
modality is understood as a principle of the context and style of construction, 
since it circumscribes and gives rise to the semantic sphere which gives sense 
to that which it contains. For example, certain spatial configurations can be 
adequately represented as an artistic ornament in one case and as a geometrical 
figure or a mythical-magical iconic formula in other cases.  
This can occur because language, myth, art and knowledge are not merely 
mirrors which do nothing more than reflect the images of a datum of the inter-
nal or external self (the being): they are not images duplicated within the two 
selves, but rather they are the truly bright sources, the conditions of seeing 
itself, just as they are the source of all formative activities.  
Cassirer follows a dual strategy. On the one hand, he puts forward argu-
ments against the mimetic theory of knowledge assuming only the original or 
natural symbolism of consciousness, the representation of consciousness in its 
entirety, which is already contained in or about to develop in every instant of 
conscious activity itself. On the other hand, he introduces a formative sponta-
neity (which is poetic only in terms of the consistency of its individual precipi-
tates) into the cultural, linguistic, mythical, artistic, logical-mathematical 
products and into the reality sui generis of culture. It is a reality which is in 
conflict with us, which resists us and which we must confront, with a modality 
and a structural style which differs from the way in which science apprehends 
and processes reality. Even the mathematical formulae with which physical sci-
ences decipher natural phenomena are a result of the very same symbolic con-
sciousness. It is not actually acceptable to conceive of an insurmountable dual-
ity between the principle of validity and formation on the one hand, and the 
world of effects which such a principle puts into action and renders consistent, 
tangible, accessible and capable of being interpreted, on the other hand. This 
is the unifying motive between all the functions of symbolic productivity, from 
language and myth to science, by way of art. In fact, Cassirer’s purpose was 
always to achieve a reconciliation between the universality of the formative 
code and the particularity of the single result, not in an abstract way but 
through the unity of living manifestations, that is through individual cultural 
artefacts which are themselves conceived and limited in the individualised con-
text/world of sense. This world of sense is indeed the only thing that can make 
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them open to the interpretation and reflection of single symbolic worlds, these 
clearly being intrahistorical and potentially universalizable.  
As a confirmation of this, what Cassirer disagreed with in his writings and 
in public debate was Heidegger’s stance with regard to the problem of knowl-
edge, starting from the early years of the last century, up to the posthumous 
notes in Cassirer’s Nachlass, which concentrate on the contradictions of Hei-
degger’s later gnoseological ideas. The origin of the deviation lies in the 
gnoseological theory, the theory of ways in which a valid apprehension, i.e. one 
that is true to reality, is activated, and consequently, the epistemological the-
ory, the reflection on assumptions and on the status of the different sciences 
which, in their reciprocal autonomy, analyze the different aspects of their own 
configurations. Of particular relevance are Cassirer’s observations on Kultur-
wissenschaften. In the pages of the Nachlass which deal with the persistent 
confusion, both in Sein und Zeit and in the works of Heidegger’s Kehre, we 
read that: 
It is not possible to separate the ontological from the ontic, the individual from 
the universal, as Heidegger seeks to do — as the one is found only in the other. 
We [Cassirer] conceive the universal as ―objective spirit‖ and objective culture. 
[...] It is here where we differ fundamentally from Heidegger – for us, the 
objective spirit is not born and does not die in the structure of daily life – the 
―impersonal‖ does not only consist of the vague social form of the mean, but 
rather in the form of the supra-personal sense – and this supra-personal aspect 
means that Heidegger’s philosophy has no basis. 
We might, if we are feeling generous, believe that such a basic theoretical ir-
regularity disappears with the Kehre. This is not the case, however. Let us con-
sider Heidegger’s notion of Unverborgenheit [unhiddenness]; according to 
this, we can autonomously develop (and hopefully with adequate critical effi-
ciency) the reading perspectives already identified by Cassirer in order to 
weaken his opponent’s structure. We will see how this notion comes into play 
particularly in the Heideggerian definition of the connection between the 
truthfulness of vision as non-concealment and the ontological validity of that 
which is acquired from the vision itself. It is, therefore, necessary to retrace in a 
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stylised yet exhaustive way the stages of the retranscription of the myth of the 
cave, carried out by Heidegger in his essay course Vom Wesen der Wahreit.2  
Let us make clear to start with that, according to Heidegger, the veiling as 
an initial condition of the existence-Being connection, as well as the entity in 
its own effectual singularity, progress through stages and that the unveiling of 
the entity, and the entity’s increasing visibility from the point of view of the 
human being is connected to the progress of the unveiling of the Being, as a 
condition of seeing the entity. From this perspective, if we consider the Pla-
tonic metaphor referred to by Heidegger, the human being always has a con-
nection with the non-veiling, even when s/he finds her/himself at their lowest 
point, chained at the back of the cave. In that condition, s/he sees only shad-
ows and is unaware as to whether s/he is perceiving only the image of the enti-
ties and not the entities themselves. In the second stage, the human being is 
released from his chains. Now s/he can turn around and look at the entities in 
the light of day, in a place of brightness and clarity where s/he can finally grasp 
them as phenomena and no longer as images of entities; these phenomena have 
an added ontological value since, according to Heidegger’s reading of Plato, 
they are more ―ontic‖ and therefore more real than the shadows.3 In the third 
stage, the human being chooses light, chooses to free himself and take shelter 
in the light. In the Platonic lexicon, s/he contemplates the Idea, as a source and 
fountain of the viewable and visual perceptive faculty. To my view, this is Hei-
degger’s interpretation of Plato.  
In the previous transposition of Heidegger’s philosophy, the parallel be-
tween the definitive Truth of Being and the unveiling of the Being should be 
obvious. The unveiling which the philosopher describes in his three stages 
takes place exclusively in the visual dimension. The metaphor of the sight of 
the entity revealing itself to the Being and of the interrelated perceptive proc-
esses, is reflected in the definition of θεορία. This is a somewhat weighty leg-
acy, if we also consider it as the exclusive strategy for apprehending the Being. 
 
2 I have drawn frequently on the clear reformulation by E. Caruso Die Wahrheit bei Heidegger, an 
unpublished manuscript presented at the Philosophisches Kolloquium organised by Volker Gerhardt, 
Humboldt University, Berlin, 20 January 2011. 
3 Against this misunderstanding see Rudolph, 2011: «Long before the contemporary debate on image 
sciences [Bildwissenschaften] Ernst Cassirer anticipated this diagnosis in his Warburg essay Eidos 
und Eidolon, in the context of an exegesis of Plato. There he observes that in Plato the relationship 
between archetype [Urbild] (eidos) and image [Bild] (eidolon) is primarily characterized not by mime-
sis, but rather by participation, by methexis. Original and copy share in one of the other». 
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In this case, the Heideggerian legacy becomes occlusive, limiting the scope of 
human perceptive elaboration to a single, exclusive and binding dimension, 
organised in the same way as an ontological hierarchy, composed of assiologi-
cally structured stages between ontological substance and the unveiling of the 
Being. We must finish by developing the observations made by Cassirer and 
Goodman on the all-consuming supremacy of the logical-visual paradigm, in 
order to dignify the different symbolic modalities of sublima-
tion/interpenetration of substance in multiple images of the world, complete 
and hospitable for the human beings who created them. 
2. Transmission of Sense due to the Contamination of Artistic Genres.  
Beyond the Original-Copy Dualism 
To start with, we must seriously consider this last possibility, that is, we must 
assume the reasonableness of an anti-foundationalist and anti-
representationist perspective which asymptotically seeks the completeness and 
beauty of the symbolic construct in terms of its quality and level of significance. 
We must do this, albeit in an interlocutory manner; if we are not willing to take 
this step it would mean that we would still feel obliged today, perhaps unknow-
ingly, to pay tribute to the legacy of Heidegger’s onerous and despotic ontol-
ogy, and to a philosophical approach based on the relationship between the 
epiphany of the being and the truth of the entity, especially in the purely theo-
retical dimension.  
In contrast with this undue supremacy, Volker Gerhardt tells us that: in the 
times of sundials, the shadow which marked the position of the daily star in the 
sky was the corporeal, authentic and existent sign of the temporal instant, 
something fundamental in the sequence of the individual and collective lives of 
the human aggregations living in a given time, in a given place.4 In actual fact, 
the word Abbild has three meanings in the German language: 
1. (Bild) image, portrait. 
2. (Wiedergabe) copy, reproduction. 
3. (Darstellung) representation. 
 
4 Citation taken from the debate occurred at the Philosphisches Kolloquium, cited in the previous 
note. 
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By affirming the full autonomy — alias autotelia — of the constituent forms 
of viewing the world as independent yet, at the same time, monadic and 
autarchic dimensions of sense, Cassirer remains throughout his entire phi-
losophical and biographical journey one of the most consistent adversaries of 
the supporters of realistic gnoseology, based on adaequatio rei et intellectus, 
surpassed in this only by Nelson Goodman. If we imagine a perfect, heated de-
bate, we can defend all the more, in respect of Cassirer (who was the precursor 
to and the inspiration behind Goodman), the views of an Italian observer who 
wrote of the American philosopher:  
The symbol is an activity of union which implies a dynamic of abstraction and 
which unifies, in the end, by means of a conventionalistic criterion. Between 
the symbol and the object to which the symbol alludes there is no relationship 
constrained by the quality of the object. The linguistic mechanisms which 
allude to an object are arbitrarily constructed: what is said in respect of an 
object does not imply the symbol’s capacity to translate the quality of the 
object. In order for there to be a symbol, it is sufficient for the linguistic 
mechanism for constructing the symbol to fulfil criteria of arbitrary coherency, 
a coherency between the symbol’s linguistic quality and the criteria which 
establish the construction style of the symbol. (Chiodo, 2011) 
The severing of the link between the Abbild (alias Bild) and an underlying es-
sence does not in fact mean that it is not possible to establish – within the code 
and according to the figural style (the construction style), typical of every sin-
gle form of construction in the world – highly recognisable degrees of com-
pleteness, quality and harmony comparatively inferior or superior to a standard 
stipulatively considered to be a primary model, which can invalidate further 
―updates‖. In turn, these display the unmistakable mark of the symbolic form 
we are dealing with, either as creators of symbols or as interpreters of the ener-
getic processes and the final oeuvres. Furthermore: a specific symbolic form 
may be characterised in terms of style and modality of the faculty of representa-
tion [Darstellung] just like art, without this involving a connection arising from 
an ontological original or from a pre-constituted immediate essence, which, as 
would occur with an incision into a cast or in relief, could link the projec-
tions/copies in the form of artistic configuration. If this can appear plausible, 
starting with the most material and ontic of all artistic symbolic forms, perhaps 
the way will be paved for more ambitious results. 
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3. A World in Motion Also Requires Sculpture to Move5 
Sculpture is one of the very first subjects of photography. Thanks to experi-
mental framing, selective focussing, variable optics, extremely close shots and 
focussed lighting, as well as techniques of collage, montage, assembly, and 
darkroom processing, photographers have not only reinterpreted sculptures 
but produced unexpected, novel creations. The three-dimensional, tactile, 
dense and heavy manifestation of plastic art has, over a period of time, been 
transformed reflexively and technically, at least since the beginning of the last 
century and thanks to its interweaving with arts originally considered as being 
of minor importance, due to being structurally reproductive – those arts which 
copy the original by reflecting it in the second grade eye-mirror of the camera 
or the movie camera. Let us not forget the opinion of Louis Aragon, who in the 
1930s said that photographic art originated in the artist’s workshop and had 
become filmic, through reportages of scenes of daily life or special collective 
events. Against every Heideggerian prediction, the experience of photography 
has become the experience of human existence. 
Something which still causes a stir and utter confusion is the success of the 
dematerialising and perspectival modality through which such an ethereal and 
derived expressive medium as photography has managed to enter the creative 
interpretation of sculpture so forcefully and how photographs have influenced 
and challenged our understanding of sculpture. Why? Perhaps because plastic-
ity is the most immediate manifestation of the substantial immediacy of the be-
ing still subject to Heideggerian legacy. Or perhaps because, as a cultural un-
said, its ―objective‖ and substantive autonomy would be more valuable than the 
subjective forms of apprehension. Would this still occur nowadays? If it did, 
the gradual but continuous, unrelentless activity of anti-representationist con-
ceptions – in other words, their positive, constructionistic formulation – would 
have been pointless.  
Despite the persistent essentialistic legacy, the subtle pervasivity of con-
structionism is evident in all areas of the contemporary – multiple, polycentric, 
polyarchic, unshakeable and fragmentary – constellations of world visions. We 
must still dispel this doubt with counter-arguments. In this present condition, 
the Zeitdiagnose, which, for many observers, corresponds to the most sophis-
 
5 «Eine Welt in Bewegung erfordert dass auch Die Skultpur sich bewegt», in the words of Ernesto 
Luginbühl. 
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ticated degree of reproducibility in Technischen Zeitalter,6 is seen both as the 
era of a true or assumed dematerialisation of things and objects of use, as well 
as the era of subjective relationships with regard to the economic treatment of 
these things.7 This is true on the one hand. On the other hand, and relative to 
the first aspect, the mark of the present time would be the predominant con-
tamination not only of genres and forms in all their meanings, but also of the 
life situations and experiences, the same social behaviours in respect of plastic-
ity and manipulability of human corporeity, transformed into a changing «to-
talen Kunstwerk». Let us refer to a crucial and provocative event in the artistic-
scientific sphere:  
The question about feasibility [Machbarkeit] in all ambits of human life is not 
negotiated only between science and politics. Here popular culture plays a 
fundamental role in all its graduations between artistic comparison, media 
communication of knowledge and criticism, and drastic matter of pain and 
desire: movies, music, comics, magazines, television and YouTube produce 
visions, nightmares, ―explanations‖, ties, myths […] of the new conceivability 
and feasibility. 
Since their beginning, Science Fiction und Horror reflect the development of 
life sciences and biology. This is not a one-sided relationship: so as popular 
culture serves science, the last one serves vice versa popular culture not only as 
a mean, but rather as a quarry of ideas, pictures, and rhetoric.8  
 
6 «It is significant that the existence of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely sepa-
rated from its ritual function. In other words, the unique value of the ―authentic‖ work of art has its 
basis in ritual, the location of its original use value. This ritualistic basis, however remote, is still rec-
ognizable as secularized ritual even in the most profane forms of the cult of beauty» (Benjamin 1968, 
p. 233). 
7 As can be read on the webpage http://www.sellingthe.net/: «The originals are free. On the other 
hand, a unique piece [Unikat] exists only through purchasing. Every unique piece [Unikat] is a part of 
the multiple. […] Then a unique piece [Unikat] exists if, in the framework of purchasing, an original is 
autographed and provided with the rules of the multiple by a buyer and an artist». 
8 The reference is to the event of great impact and enormous profile which started with the Kul-
turstiftung des Bundes in collaboration with Kampnagel Internationale Kulturfabrik and the Berlin-
Brandenburgischen Akademia der Wissenschaft: the Congress and Mise-en-scène Die Untoten – Life 
Science & Pulp Fiction (Kampnagel, Hamburg, 12-14 May 2011). Responsibility for the overall 
concept, from which the previous passages are taken, lies with Dr. Karin Harrasser, Dr. Oliver Müller, 
Georg Seeßlen, Markus Metz (scientific curators), and Dr. Alexander Klose (Kulturstiftung des 
Bundes). There is an urgent need for the social and philosophical sciences to recommence a reading of 
the signs of the times, to reinterpret with courage and restlessness the visual, artistic and literary lan-
guages of the present day, avoiding hierarchies and purisms, accepting inter-genre contaminations 
 
134                                     Humana.Mente – Issue 18 – September 2011 
 
And yet... if this seems indubitable, what does remain palpable in this kaleido-
scope of conversational and imaginative records is a kind of nostalgia for the 
myth of immediacy and eternity, the search for something primordial, intact 
and authentic, something that is and will remain under and beyond its transient 
manifestations. The myth of the origins of the self and the ―we‖ is still some-
thing that people go in search of, as if seeking the ―vestals of the holy grail‖, so 
that, once its eternal essence has been obtained, this essential, substantiating 
nucleus can instil a sense of security and guarantee the duration of the self for 
everyone and the duration of the world itself, at the inevitable end of individual 
and collective life.  
On one side, Mircea Eliade prompted us to search in escapist literature 
(and artistic expressions) for the imaginary and myths which we believe have 
vanished from our civilisation. Myths, as symbolic constructs capable of giving 
sense to many aspects of individual and social life, must never be condemned, 
and certainly not ignored, nor misunderstood, in that they are structuring ele-
ments of the global mass society. Cassirer’s lesson is illuminating as far as the 
question on the proper way of coping with myth is concerned. Symbols and 
representations are equally useful tools and, potentially, very dangerous, 
―light‖ arms, that is pervasive and effective in the most hidden recesses of the 
sphere of construction of the individual and collective self. How to address and 
deconstruct them is the first, unavoidable skill to be learned. 
4. Cultures and Construction of Sense. Political Myths and Wesenkerne 
With regard to the polyphonic, not always peaceful, connection between these 
styles and modalities of apprehension and the configuration of the world, and 
the respective historical-cultural concretisations, Cassirer prematurely pointed 
out one of the paths which, although well travelled by some particularly sharp 
and accredited intellectuals and social scientists, has yet to become the main 
road. Cassirer immediately rules out the idea that formative worlds – the 
spheres of sense created from symbolic forms — are also carriers of symbolic 
contents given once and for all, which have also made up the foundational nu-
cleus, the Wesenkerne, of interrelated historical communities.  
 
(artistic, literary, visual) and rejecting the superciliousness that gives preference to the knowledge of 
high culture over the knowledge and practices of low culture. 
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On reading again Cassirer’s posthumous works we discover an explicit and 
detailed critique of the monadic and self-centred vision of plural mono-
culturalism, of the contemporary phenomenon of multicultural societies 
―woven like a mosaic‖, opposed even by Amartya Sen. Many years ago, Cas-
sirer believed that cultures were units of function, layers for bringing up to date 
the ―sense’; these layers cannot be considered as being limited in time or as 
something certain or predetermined which is deployed in time, but as the inex-
haustible act of pure placement, of beginning itself. Once again: ―culture‖ (but 
also ―nation‖) is a relationship concept which encompasses the connection 
between something historically given with a dimension of sense and therefore 
with something which is always newly assigned; the notion of culture encom-
passes a factor which in principle is not empirically perceptible, a pure factor of 
sense (Cassirer, 1995, p. 283).  
We are well aware that, in direct antithesis to a formal-structural perspec-
tive such as that of Cassirer, cultures were formed into cultural nuclei, made up 
of myths, customs, artistic productions and specific and well-defined behav-
iours. We also know how these ―cores‖ were depicted as molecules, better still 
as monads, which produce exclusion, indifference, hostility and aggressiveness 
towards others. This inauspicious circumstance does not, however, exclude the 
fact that cultures can be an additional and free source for anyone seeking their 
own identity in the dimension of belonging to a group, on the condition, never-
theless, that these cultures are correctly designed, that is to say, as possibilities 
for deploying the sense, according to an open generative code. Unfortunately, 
this does not always happen. Much more frequently cultures are unduly petri-
fied and molecularised by their adherents who concretize them in immoveable 
essences, transforming them into social factors of indifference, if not quite hos-
tility, towards their non-companions. In fact, tolerance, understood as the in-
different sentiment of the ―live and let die‖ approach, is an attitude which is 
inadequate for capturing and confronting the pluri-cultural and asymmetric 
reality of modern-day societies.  
The implementational problems of a genuine, not false, peaceful co-
existence between explanatory mythographies of cultures can already be seen 
within the context of a non-extreme, albeit consistent, cultural pluralism, as in 
the case of Europe. In fact, we should look at the example of Spain in order to 
guard against the risk that could be incurred if the European myths were con-
sidered as being equal to the essential cores [Wesenkerne] of individual cul-
tural-national identities, that is as ―fixed‖ components of Europe’s pluralist 
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physiognomy, or if, as a matter of course, they were to be accepted within a 
framework of tolerance of manner and therefore ephemeral (to be understood, 
both in its meaning of moral behaviour and political practice, as well as recip-
rocal indifference). Behaviours and practices inspired by tolerance would be 
misleading, since they would substantiate false visions – visions that were es-
sentialistic, static and monadic – of national identities and myths. We would 
fall into a sort of essentialistic naturalisation of foundational myths. As a solu-
tion, we can list and reveal the components which are common to rival myths, 
for example, the myths of the Reconquest and Al-Andalus, in order to highlight 
their normal, instrumental nature. Both these myths are constructs which 
originated on the stage of Spain’s national history in order to achieve suprem-
acy as the nation’s main symbolic representations, in terms of its education, its 
collective memory and, in short, its political culture. The three aspects which 
are equally present in both these myths are: their nature as artefact, their in-
strumentality in terms of ideals of socio-political integration (even if these are 
assiologically opposed) and – the most important aspect in this argument – 
their basic narrative structure. Understanding the flexibility of such a narrative 
draft to produce assiologically opposed myths is a way of escaping from the 
dualistic and oppositional logic of the mythical nuclei, should it ever be discov-
ered that, despite the pretext of originality, purity and distinctiveness, these 
rival myths are the product of contaminations and transformations of an impor-
tant common story-line, one which is essential for both versions of the crucial 
events concerning the same theme, the mythologem, which is the same plot 
and narrative of sense being susceptible to multiple variations.9 
 
9 In 711 a.D., armed units of Arabs and Berbers landed near Gibraltar and conquered most of the 
Iberian Peninsula. The resident population put up minimal resistance. One hundred and fifty years 
later, the complex situation had stabilised; the land which the Romans had called ―Hispania‖ now had a 
new name – ―Al-Andalus‖. In the north of the peninsula, however, kingdoms characterised by a dis-
tinct anti-Moslem political identity were formed. From a certain point onwards, the Christian rulers 
conducted a military campaign of expansion which was to last for centuries, up until the conquest of 
Granada, the last Arabic stronghold on the peninsula, by Isabella of Castile and Alfonso of Aragon in 
1492. The myth of the Reconquest was actually created in the ninth century, in order to justify the 
Christian rulers’ military expansion towards the south of the peninsula; nevertheless, the myth spread, 
gaining full recognition in later centuries and huge plausibility, since it contributed to the consolida-
tion of a political identity based on a centralised, unified state, in the same way as has been the experi-
ence of modern-day Spain. For a detailed reconstruction of the origins and narratives structures of 
both myths see Henry, 2000. 
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As we can see from the previous example, the more general, and as yet un-
resolved, problem is the difficulty in making a scientifically accredited version 
not only of the notion of ―cultural nuclei‖, but of the notion of culture itself, 
prevailing in public language. We should systematically turn to a vision which 
inspires us or which grants heuristic validity to the standards of qualitative so-
cial sciences and to the most sophisticated and advanced standards of the Kul-
turwissenschaften. This, at least, is the job of those who carry out intellectual 
activities.  
As a crucial remark: here the reflexive paradigm/pattern is explicitly 
adopted, against the ascriptive one, in order to define collectivities such as cul-
tural aggregations. According to the first pattern, human groups are extremely 
relevant as active interpreters of their own practices. In many cases there exists 
a ―we‖, an aggregation of individuals that adopt the first person plural to define 
themselves, recognising themselves in a series of common features, but not 
without opacity and conflicts (Henry, 2008, 2010). From the other side, the 
identity of ―we‖ is not a substantial unity of convictions, of rules, of objectiv-
ised rituals or materials, but it is rather a combination of routines and symbolic 
practices, a mobile background of references for the actions of the subjects 
(men and women) involved in often conflictual and asymmetric symbolic ex-
changes. Let us consider the corresponding human aggregates encompassing 
diverse combinations of such Weltbilder (linguistic, mythic, artistic style of 
grasping and creating their own worlds); they are collectivities in progress, 
porous, permeable, and able to produce as outfits specific interlacements (im-
brications, the French géographie sociale) between socio-cultural relations 
and spatial and temporal relations, in turn subject to germination through con-
tact and impact (Elden, 2005). Human aggregations outside of a social-
cultural structure of space and time are not conceivable. They are what they are 
only by means of prototypical ways of apprehending and constructing living 
worlds as textures of meaning. So far, in this contemporary assumption held by 
some contemporary social scientists, we can recognise as general inspiration 
the notion of symbolic form; it indicates, as we know, an autotelic and dynamic 
symbolic world, a specific way of texturing meaning according to a generative 
code open to free and diverse outputs. This model was coined and developed 
by Ernst Cassirer as opposite model to an essentialistic, monolithic idea of cul-
ture/s. 
So far, we agree that cultures as results of such symbolical intercourses are 
texture and worlds of meaning, always open to controversial and conflictual 
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reinterpretations. They are neither essences that determine us, nor things that 
we possess. We could also dismantle the holistic myth of cultural belonging 
like the merely individualistic belonging of the global cultural consumer. Cul-
tures are shared practices, they are routines, sets of played games, dynamic, 
conflictual frameworks for culture-interchanging subjects.10 Therefore, first of 
all, we need to learn how to play and the constraints and capabilities cannot be 
easily or automatically universalized. We have to take part in the game, to ―be‖ 
part of the game itself, if we want to play. Namely, to be inside the cultural 
game, inside the texture of meaning, to be part of the elementary interchange 
practices. If we were born and brought up enmeshed in these practices, in this 
game, it would not be difficult to follow them. Equilibrium between strategic 
and creative action is needed in order not only to give birth to, but even to en-
dorse and implement the intercourse between each individual and his/her 
group. Given such highly specific conditions of being part of a so-called culture 
— a game, in order to make the players’ circle more inclusive along the way — 
we need to produce similar complex conditions and processes of primary and 
secondary socialisation in the polities we all, according to asymmetrical pat-
terns of integration, still live in. 
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